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as it read in
that marri(od daughter of
for old age benefits slHtll not be
to make
eontribution unless she has income which is her separate propmay not be eonstrued
subjecting support payments
she n'ceives from ex-husband after divorce, and which
as basis for determination of her liaas this would in effect require her ex-husband
which he was not
to do
[3] !d.-Support by Relatives.-Alimony is not ''income" within
of
of Old
Security Law (see W elf. &
of a responsible relative.
[4] !d.-Support by Relatives.·-Where divorce decree orders payment of support
for
of wife and minor child
but makes no
what portion of monthly
payments are for child's support and what portion for wife,
it would not be appropriate for court, in action brought by
county to recover from wife aid granted by it to her indigent
mother under Old
Security Law, to make apportionment
which court would have to do before it could ascertain wife's
liability; the proper forum for making such allocation is court
in which divorce
rend<·red.
[5] !d.-Support by Relatives.--Ahility of divorced wife to support
her indigent mother und<'r Old Agn Security Lnw is not shown
when undetermined
of income proved is not hers but
is for minor child.

APPEAI1 from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra
Costa Cmmty. Norman A. Gregg, .Judge. Heverscd.
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§§ 7, 8; Am.Jur., Social Seeurity,
McK. Dig. Reference:
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Gendel & Haskoff and Bernard
Frances \Y. Collins, Distriet
David ,J.
Distrid
CAH'l'EH, J .---Defendant
her for $225 in favor of
for the months
and
represents the alleged
for those months of '"""''-v"~""'
tho adult daughter of 1\lrs . .LiJta Hachenberger, for support
furnished to the latter by plaintiff under the Old
Law.
& Inst.
§ 2000 et
l''rom the stipulation of the parties and the findings of the
court it appears defendant is the adult daughter of M:rs. Hachenberger. The latter made due application to plaintiff county
and qualified under the Old Age Security Law to reeeive
old age assistance. Plaintiff granted aid and paid lVIrs. Hachenberger $75 per month for the months June, July and August, 1951. Thereafter Mrs. Hachenberger moved to another
county. 'When the applieation \vas made defendant supplied
to the board of supervisors a statement of responsible relative
(Vv elf. & Inst. Code, § 2225) and refused the board's demand
that she eontribute to the support of her mother.
Defendant is divorced from her husband and has eustody
of a minor ehild. Her sole ineome is what she receiyes from
her former husband for the support of herself and child, the
amount being a percentage of her ex-husband's earnings as a
freelanee writer. 'l'he eourt found that during the months
for which judgment was rendered ag<tinst her she received
$660.60 per month support money; defemhmt was buying a
home and a 1950 Chrysler, sending her ehild to a private
sehool, and employing a gardener, yet aeeumnlated $1,400
whieh she loaned to her former husband on a three-year note;
that she was pecuniarily able to contribute $75 per month to
the support of her mother.
Defendant eontends: (1) That the support received by her
from her ex-husband under the divorce deeree was not ineome
within the meaning of section 2181 of the "\Velfare and Institutions Code and with only such income she is not a person
pecuniarily able to support her mother within the provisions
of seetion 2224 of that code; (2) that ewn including that
ineome she is not pecuniarily able to support her mother
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It is to it we
look to ascertain whether the
relative is
case, to reimburse the
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supt·a, make referability'' of
m"~~,.~,_ to one within the
class mentioned. No
those terms, at least until the 1953
supra, to
section 2181. At the time here
there was the proof the applicant for old age
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parties have
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for his wife's
marriage
he should not be after divorce where the funds he pays to his
ex-wife are the same as he would use to support her during
marriage. For the same reason the funds are not responsible
for his
's support after they have reached the
ex-wife's
hands. If they were, then by
money he handed to her during marriage to pay for
expenses of the
would also be her separate property and liable for her mother's support. Neither before nor
after divorce when he is
support, is he making a
gift to his wife or ex-wife. If one of the purposes of the rule
excusing him from supporting his wife's parents is that otherwise there would be an interference with his right of management of the commu:aity property, the reason still applies
even though there is a divorce as he has right of control over
his own funds and has the right to show in the divorce action
that the alimony should be reduced. The divorce decree and
its :msceptibility to modification as to alimony is another reason supporting the conclusion here reached. It creates a confusing situation where the court in the divorce action has fixed
the amount he must pay to support his wife and for another
court in an action (as we have here) under the Welfare and
Institutions Code to decide that the alimony is more than
enough; indeed that there is enough left over to support defendant's mother. After the latter determination presumably
the ex-husband could request in the divorce action that the
alimony be reduced. Suppose a reduction is made; the county
could again, in effect, reverse that decision, by finding there
was still enough to require plaintiff to support her mother.
Such detraction from the finality of judgments and multiplicity of alterations thereof should not be countenanced unless there is unequivocal expression of the Legislature to that
effect.
[3] While the court was dealing with a separate maintenance decree and an action by the public agency to compel the
wife recipient of support money payable thereunder under
New York welfare laws, the reasoning is persuasive in Application of Dunaway, sttpra, 174 Misc. 735 [22 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71].
The court in holding that the alimony could not be considered
in determining the wife's ability to support her father said:
''I hold that alimony is not income in the true sense of the
word. It can not be reached in this proceeding. Public policy
is against it. The Courts have uniformly held that alimony
in a separation action is awarded for a particular purpose,
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pm·pose <md
"'l'hc
Court has
pur:mant to the provisions of § 11G9 of the Civil Practiee Ad, that the sum of
$:300 per month is reasonable for the care, education and
maintenanee of the
child and for the
of herself. It is not the
of this Court to
to
the order of the
Court
''Alimony is geanted in the j
of a Court of Equity
iu accordance with the eircumstances of the
but it
never loses its distinctive character. 'When awarded, it is
not so much in the nature of the payment of a debt as in that
of the performance of a duty.
''There is no liability on the part of JiJ(lwin S. Clark to sup-port his father-in--law and . . . 'The decree cannot logically
work the miracle of transforming the duty which he does owe
into one which he does not and never did owe.' Yet this result
·would be obtained if the relief sought in this proceeding were
granted.''
[ 4] There is another factor of significance. 'l'he divorce
decree ordered the payment of the support money for the support of defendant wife ancl the m·inoT child. No segregation
was made in the divorce decree showing what portion of the
monthly payments were for the child's support and what portion for the wife. It is not appropriate for the court in the
instant action in which the husband is not repr·esented to make
the apportionment which it ·would have to do before it could
ascertain defendant's ability. It would have to do that beea use manifestly any portion received by the wife for the
child's support is not part of her income and cannot be considered in determining her ability to support her mother.
'l'he proper forum for making such an allocation, if it must
be made, is the court in which the divorce decree was rendered.
(See Wilkins v. Wilkins, 100 Cal.App.2cl 730 [224 P.2d 371] .)
[5] If we assume the court may make the apportionment
in the instant action, it did not do so here. Plaintiff has not
proved how much of the support money was for the child's
support and hence has failed to supply facts upon which a
determination could be made respecting the ability of defendant to support her mother. Ability has not been shown when
a portion of the income proved was not defendant's but was
for the child.
We hold, therefore, that in the absence of proof of other
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